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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
THOMAS DEAN LAKEY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 18,250 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by Information with the crime of Theft 
by Deception, a second degree felony, in that on or about the 
31st day of January, 1981, in violation of Sections 76-6-405 and 
76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, the Appellant 
obtained or exercised control over the property of Richard Ryan 
by deception with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and 
that the value of the property exceeded $1,000.00. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by a jury in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Utah County, with the Honorable George E. 
Ballif, Judge, presiding, on the 29th day of October, 1981. 
Following the trial, the jury found the Appellant guilty as 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
charged. Appellant was sentenced on the 22nd day of January, 
1982, to an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years. Notice of Appeal 
in this matter was filed in the Utah County Clerk's Office, on 
February 16, 1982. 
NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully requests the Court to reverse the 
judgment of guilt entered in the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During January of 1981, Appellant was operating a gift and 
toy store in Provo, Utah. At some t~me during that month, he had 
occasion to view samples of clothing owned by one Richard Ryan 
which were being offered for sale to various businesses. 
Appellant expressed to Mr. Ryan some interest in purchasing some 
of the items to be sold in his gift and toy store. At 
Appellant's request, Mr. Ryan brought some merchandise to 
Appellant's store on January 30, 1981. Mr. Ryan testified that 
the price of the merchandise which was delivered was $2,763.18. 
Following delivery of the merchandise, a discussion was had be-
tween Appellant and Mr. Ryan regarding payment. Appellant 
tendered a personal check to Mr. Ryan for the purchase price of 
the merchandise and asked Mr. Ryan to not cash the check that day 
but to merely deposit the check into his checking account. 
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Mr. Ryan understood that Appellant intended to make some deposits 
and he agreed to not cash the check that day. Appellant testi-
fied that he was negotiating with four individuals to invest mer-
chandise and capital into his business and that he expected to 
deposit enough cash into his account to cover the check by the 
time the check reached his bank for payment. 
The money expected by the Appellant did not materialize and 
the check written to Mr. Ryan was returned unpaid due to insuffi-
cient funds in Appellant's account. There was contradictory 
testimony regarding whether or not Appellant offered to return 
all or part of the merchandise to Mr. Ryan. Testimony from both 
sides, however, indicated that Appellant offered to pay Mr. Ryan 
in installments of 10% per month and that Mr. Ryan refused the 
offer on the advice of the police in order to avoid jeopardizing 
the case against Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
A. There was insufficient evidence presented at trial to 
show that the property was obtained by deceptionG 
Section 76-6-405(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
provides as follows: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control 
over property of another by deception and with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof. 
-3-
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This Section sets forth two basic elements of the crime of 
Theft by Deception: (1) Obtaining control of property by decep-
tion, and (2) having a purpose to deprive the owner of the pro-
perty. The first element of this crime will be dealt with in 
this section of Appellant's brief. The second section will deal 
with the element of purpose to deprive. 
"Deception" is defined in Section 76-6-401(5), Utah Code 
Annoated, 1953, as amended with five separate definitions, only 
one of which must be proven. Those five definitions are as 
follows: 
(a) Creates or conf ims by words or conduct an im-
pression of law or fact that is false and that the actor 
does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect 
the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact 
that the actor peviously created or confirmed by words or 
conduct that is likely to affect the judgment of another 
and that the actor does not now believe to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another fm acquiring information likely 
to affect his judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property 
without disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, 
or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, 
whether the lien, security interest, claim, or impediment 
is or is not valid or is or is not a matter of official 
records; or (e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the 
judgment of another in the transaction, which performance 
the actor does not intend to perform or knows will not be 
performed; provided, however, tha~ failure ~o perform the 
promise in issue without other evidence of intent or know-
ledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend 
to perform or knew the promise would not be performed. 
One of the five alternatives must be shown to exist as of 
the time possession is obtained and that possession was obtained 
-4-
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as a result of that deception. In Jury Instruction No. 9, the 
Court listed three of those five alternatives as the definition 
of "deception"; those being paragraphs (5) (a), (b) and (e). 
Each of the three definitions relates to a false impression 
of fact which the defendant either creates or fails to correct at 
the time possession is transferred. 
The State apparently asserts that Appellant created in im-
pression of fact that the check was good as of the time it was 
given to Mr. Ryan. Mr. Ryan's testimony, however, reveals that 
Appellant never represented that the check was then good, but 
rather that it would be good in the future. He testified that 
Appellant asked him not to cash the check that day (T. page 15, 
Lines 29-30) (all references to the transcript of trial in this 
brief will be designated in this manner); that there was no 
conversation as to whether or not the check would clear the bank 
(T. page 16, lines 10-12); and that he understood Appellant in-
tended to make some deposits and didn't want to mess up his bank 
account (T. page 16, lines 16-20). At no time did the Appellant 
represent that the check was good at that time. The only im-
pression of that which was shown by the State to have been 
created by the Appellant was that the check would clear the bank 
if deposited in Mr. Ryan's account, because the Appellant had 
some deposits he intended to make. That impression of fact later 
turned out to be false. The check did not later clear the bank. 
This portion of the definition of deception was proven by the 
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State. The Appellant never contested the fact that the check did 
not actually clear the bank. 
The portion of the definition of "deception" which Appellant 
asserts was not proven revolves around the words "that the actor 
does not believe to be true". Did the Appellant, at the time he 
told Mr. Ryan that he intended to make some deposits before the 
check reached the bank, not believe that impression of fact to be 
true? Or, did the Appellant actually believe the check would 
clear the bank if deposited in Mr. Ryan's account. Did the 
Appellant actually believe he would deposit enough money to cover 
the check by the time it reached his bank? 
The Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence 
produced by the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Appellant knew the check would not clear his bank. The State's 
evidence through bank employee, Rick Anderson, showed that there 
were not enough funds in Appellant's account on the date the 
check was written, to cover the check. The State further pro-
duced testimony of Richard Ryan which showed the following: 
1. Appellant asked him to not cash the check, but to de-
posit the check in his bank account (T. page 15, lines 29-30). 
2. Appellant told him that if he wanted cash rather than a 
check, that he could come back to the store the following Monday 
and bring the merchandise at that time (T. page 20, lines 
14-15). 
-6-
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3. He understood that Appellant had some deposits he was 
going to make so that his account would not be messed up (T. page 
16, lines 16-20). 
At the conclusion of the State's case, the jury had before 
it testimony that the check was written on January 30, 1981; that 
on that date there were not sufficient funds to cover the check; 
that Appellant asked Mr. Ryan not to cash the check that day, but 
to deposit the check; that Appellant had some deposits he intend-
ed to make to cover the check before it reached his bank for pay-
ment; and that when the check reached Appellant's bank for 
payment, those expected deposits had not been made. 
The impression of fact created by Appellant was that 
Appellant intended to make some deposits and that the check would 
clear the bank if deposited in Mr. Ryan's account and allowed to 
run through the normal banking channels. In the evidence pre-
sented by the State, there was nothing to indicate or allow the 
jury to infer that Appellant did not actually believe the 
deposits would be made. There is likewise nothing in the 
evidence to indicate or from which the jury could infer that the 
Appellant did not actually believe the check would clear his bank 
after being deposited in Mr. Ryan's account. 
The State presented ample evidence on the nature of the 
impression of fact and that the impression of fact later turned 
out to be false. However, the State presented no evidence at all 
from which the jury could infer that on January 30, 1981, 
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Appellant did not believe he would make sufficient deposits to 
cover the check by the time it reached his bank. 
In the case of State v. Forshee, 588 P.2d 181 (Utah, 1978), 
the Court considered, for the first time, the elements of the 
statute under which Appellant was convicted. In that case, the 
Court affirmed the finding of deception where the defendant had 
represented that a car's mileage was 33,000 when he knew that 
representation to be false. The Court also likened Section 
76-6-405, Utah Code Annotated, to its predecessor, the crime of 
obtaining property by false pretenses. Cases considering the 
crime of obtaining property by false pretenses have uniformly 
required a false representation which the defendant knew to be 
false. The representation made by Appellant in this case was 
that he intended to make deposits so that the check would be good 
by the time it reached the bank and that Mr. Ryan could not get 
cash for the check on that date. Those representations were not 
false and were not believed by the Defendant to be false. 
Appellant actually intended to make deposits and Mr. Ryan could 
not cash the check that day. The Appellant never represented 
that the check was good on the date of January 30, 1981, and he 
made sure Mr. Ryan knew that he couldn't get cash that day. 
We are subjected to false impressions of fact every day of 
our lives. The essential difference between a false impression 
of fact and deception is the state of mind of the person creating 
the impression of fact. Anytime a check is written, an impress-
ion of fact is created that the check will clear the bank. It is 
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not uncommon for checks to be written with the belief that de-
posits will be made before the check reaches the bank. It is not 
uncommon for those expected deposits to fall through, resulting 
in dishonor of checks. Without some evidence upon which the jury 
could find that Appellant knew the check would not clear the bank 
when it was presented to the bank for payment, the jury's verdict 
of guilt is unsupported by evidence and must be reversed. 
Appellant's testimony presented at trial was to the effect 
that he had contacted a number of individuals to invest money and 
merchandise in his store. He further testified that he wrote 
checks to various individuals during the month of January, 1981, 
wih the belief that the money would be there to cover the checks 
before the checks reached his bank (T. page 54, lines 19-21). He 
further testified that the money he expected did not arrive, that 
some of the potential investors ended up supplying merchandise 
around the time that he wrote the check to Mr. Ryan. 
The only evidence relating to Appellant's belief was pre-
sented by Appellant and was uncontroverted by the State. The 
only evidence before the jury regarding the Appellant's belief 
was that Appellant actually believed he would receive enough 
money to cover the check before it reached his bank. The State 
presented no evidence to show that Appellant did not believe the 
money would be received and presented no evidence to contradict 
Appellant's testimony that he actually believed he would receive 
enough money to cover the check before it reached his bank. 
-9-
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Without some evidence that Appellant knew his representation to 
be false, there is no deception as defined by the law. The only 
thing the State showed was poor business judgment, not actual 
deception. Proof of deception required some evidence to show 
that Appellant knew the check would not be covered. The 
Appellant made no representation which he knew to be false. The 
State presented no evidence to the contrary and the jury's 
verdict is not supported by the evidence. 
B. There was insufficient evidence presented at trial to 
show that Appellant had a purpose to deprive the owner of 
the property. 
The second element of Section 76-6-405, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, is that the Defendant have a purpose to deprive 
the owner of the property. Appellant contends that the evidence 
presented at trial on this issue was insufficient to justify the 
jury's verdict. The Appellant's intentions regarding the 
property can only be learned from what the Appellant may have 
said or done. 
In 50 Am Jur 2d Larceny, Section 36, Page 195, the general 
rule is stated that: 
..• it is not larceny to take a thing for a temporary 
purpose with a bona fide intention of returning it, 
or or paying for it or otherwise accounting therefor 
to the owner, even though such intention is not 
carried out. 
The State produced no evidence of the Appellant's intent to 
-10-
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deprive the owner of the property. The State produced no 
evidence from which the jury could infer or assume that the 
Appellant intended to deprive the owner of the property. 
The following uncontroverted evidence was produced at trial 
to show what the Appellant did and said: 
1. The Appellant had instructed his clerk to return mer-
chandise to those who wanted it (T. page 44, lines 15-16). 
2. Mr. Ryan went to Appellant's business on Feburary 28, 
1981 and saw some of his merchandise (T. page 71, lines 12-17). 
3. One supplier went to Appellant's business on February 
28, 1981 and picked up his merchandise (T. page 48, lines 29-30). 
4. Appellant offered to pay Mr. Ryan a certain sum each 
month to pay for the goods, but Mr. Ryan would not accept partial 
payments due to his conversations with the police regarding 
jeopardizing the case against Appellant. 
There was a conflict in the testimony regarding whether or 
not Appellant had offered Mr. Ryan the return of all or part of 
the merchandise. The evidence is clear that after the check was 
dishonored, Mr. Ryan went to Appellant's business and at least 
one-third of the merchandise was there at that time. There is no 
evidence that Appellant ever tried to hide the merchandise or 
that he did not intend to pay for the merchandise. Even based 
upon the State's evidence, Appellant offered to pay for the goods 
at the rate of 10% per month, but Mr. Ryan would not accept 
partial payment. 
-11-
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CONCLUSION 
Looking at the evidence as a whole, this case involves a 
merchant who ~ought merchandise by way of a check, expecting to 
deposit enough money to cover the check by the time it got to his 
bank. When his expected deposits fell through, he tried to 
return the merchandise and/or pay monthly payments to pay the 
supplier for the goods. There is nothing in the record to show 
any intent on the Appellant's part to not pay for the goods. The 
evidence shows he tried to pay for the goods on an installment 
basis, but the victim refused. 
There is no evidence that Appellant had any intent to 
deprive the owner of the property, either at the time of sale or 
later. All evidence shows that he intended to pay for the pro-
perty or to allow the owner to take the merchandise back. There 
is nothing to support the jury's verdict and it must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this /~ day of August, 1982. 
i 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
~~ 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to DAVID L. WILKENSON, 
Utah Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111 this /~ day of August, 1982. 
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